Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing by Fetherstonhaugh, David et al.
Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life:
A Study of Psychophysical Numbing
David Fetherstonhaugh*
Department of Psychology
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305-2130
(415) 725-5487; fax (415) 725-5699;
email df@psych.stanford.edu
Paul Slovic
University of Oregon and
Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon
Stephen M. Johnson
Decision Research
James Friedrich
Willamette University
Journal ofRiskand Uncertainty, in press
December 20 1996
Abstract
A fundamental principle of psychophysics is thatpeople's ability to discriminate change
ina physical stimulus diminishes as the magnitude of the stimulus increases. We find that
people also exhibit diminished sensitivity in valuing lifesaving interventions against a
background ofincreasing numbers oflives atrisk. We call this "psychophysical numbing."
Studies 1 and 2 found that an intervention saving a fixed numberof lives was judged
significantly more beneficial when fewer lives were atrisk overall. Study 3found that
respondents wanted the minimum number oflives a medical treatment would have to save to
merit a fixed amount of funding to bemuch greater for a disease with a larger number of
potential victims than for adisease with a smaller number. The need to better understand the
dynamics ofpsychophysical numbing and to determine its effects on decision making is
discussed.
Key Words: Decision making, life saving, value oflife, risk-benefit analysis, psychophysical
numbing
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Nobelist Albert Szent-Gyorgi once observed, "I am deeply moved if I see one man
suffering and wouldrisk my life for him. ThenI talk impersonally about the possible
pulverization ofour big cities, with a hundred million dead. I am unable to multiply one man's
suffering by a hundred million." Most people seem to at least tacitly appreciate thekind of
insensitivity toward loss ofhuman life articulated in Szent-Gyorgi's statement. We recognize the
need for creative attempts to drive home the severity of catastrophic losses. One activist group
lobbied Congress byplacing 38,000 pairs of shoes, boots, and sneakers around the Capitol
building to sensitize representatives to the 38,000 gunshot fatalities America experiences
annually ("38,000 Shoes," 1994). Another example isgiven by Rummel (1995), who asked
people to consider this century's total democide (state sanctioned killing, aside from warfare) of
170,000,000 by imagining a chain ofbodies laid head to toe reaching from Honolulu, across the
Pacific and the continental U.S., to Washington D.C. and then back againmore than 16 times.
Lossesof life framed in these ways attempt to mitigate the insensitivity that seems to occur so
naturally when we try to comprehend past tragedies orthink rationally about how to mitigate or
prevent large losses of life in the future.
What psychological principles lie behind this insensitivity? In the 19th century, E. H.
Weber and Gustav Fechner discovered a fundamental psychophysicalprinciple that describes
how we perceive and discriminate changes in our physical environment. They found that
people's ability to detect changes in aphysical stimulus decreases rapidly as the magnitude ofthe
stimulus increases (Weber, 1834; Fechner, 1860). What is known today as "Weber's law" states
that inorder for a change ina stimulus tobecome iust noticeable, a fixed percentage must be
added. Thus perceived difference is a relative matter. To a small stimulus, only a small amount
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mustbe added. To a large stimulus, a large amount must be added to be equally noticeable.
Fechner proposed a logarithmic lawto model thisnonlinear growth of sensation. Numerous
empirical studies by S. S. Stevens (1975) have demonstrated that the growth ofsensory
magnitude (\\i) is best fit bya power function of thestimulus magnitude <|>
\\i = k()r
where the exponent Pis typically less than one for measurements ofphenomena such as
loudness, brightness, and even the value ofmoney (Galanter, 1962).1 For example, ifthe
exponent is0.5 as it is in some studies ofperceived brightness, a light that is four times the
intensity of another light willbejudged only twice as bright.
Our cognitive and perceptual systems seem tobedesigned to sensitize us to small
changes in our environment, possibly at the expense ofmaking us less able to detect and respond
to large changes. As the psychophysical research indicates, constant increases in the magnitude
ofa stimulus typically evoke less and less ofachange in response. Applying this principle to the
valuing ofhuman life suggests that a form ofpsychophysical numbing may result from our
inability to appreciate losses oflife as they become more catastrophic—a phenomenon that could
impair our ability to make consistent, equitable, and wise decisions.2
Evidence ofpsychophysical numbing comes from a study by Summers, Slovic, Hine, and
Zuliani (in press), who hypothesized that people may exhibit a systematic distortion in
perception ofdeath tolls from wars not unlike the systematic distortion found in many traditional
experiments in sensory psychophysics. They found that deaths from wars were perceived
according to apower function where p=0.32. Thus, respondents in these experiments perceived
a war that claimed nine times thenumber of lives as a second war to be only about three times
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greater in magnitude. The degree of psychophysical numbing changed in these experiments as a
function ofhow the losses were framed. Respondents' insensitivity was reduced (P = .99) when
the same total number of casualties was presented as "deaths per day" rather than "deaths per
war."
Kahneman andTversky (1979) have incorporated thispsychophysical principle of
decreasing sensitivity into prospect theory, a descriptive theory ofdecision making under
uncertainty. A major element ofprospect theory is the value function, which relates subjective
value to actual gains or losses. The function isconcave for gains and convex for losses. When
applied to human lives, the value function implies that the subjective value ofsaving a specified
number of lives is greater for a smaller tragedy than for a larger one (when the life-saving effort
is framed as reducing a loss). Such psychophysical numbing may have dramatic implications for
the judgments and decisions people make. For example, an intervention that reduces the number
ofdeaths in a tragedy from 2000 to 1000 may bejudged substantially more valuable than one
that reduces deaths from 99,000 to 98,000. Eventhough bothinterventions save the same number
of lives, in the former people may decide to act while in the latter they may not, perhaps under
the impression that saving 1,000 lives out of2,000 is a significant proportion but saving 1,000
out of 99,000 is merely "a drop in the bucket."
How should we value the saving of a life? We believe that, in most circumstances, "a life
is a life"—the value of saving a certain number ofpeople from death should not beaffected by
the number or proportion ofothers who remain unsaved. This perspective presumes a linear
relationship between the number oflives one can save in a given situation and the value
associated with saving them. Thus an effort saving 200 lives would have twice the value of
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another that saves 100 lives in the same circumstances. This would lead decision makers to
prefer the intervention that saves the greatest number oflives even if that number is
proportionally smallest when compared to the number at risk. Stated differently, we argue that
the value of lives saved should be based on the number an interventioncan save, and should
therefore beindependent ofthe size ofthe population from which the saved lives originate.
Under a one-to-one correspondence between thenumber and value of saved lives, the
value ofa life-saving effort should also be independent ofwhen inthe process those lives are
saved. For example, the value ofsaving the first 100 individuals in a tragedy should not change if
instead these individuals happened to bethe last 100 saved. According to prospect theory's
curved value function, however, the value of saving lives will inmany cases depend onwhen in
the process those lives are saved. For example, the value ofreducing deaths by 100 early in an
intervention would not likely beequivalent to that ofanidentical reduction later in the process; a
reduction in loss of life that brings the death toll closer to zero might appear more valuable.
Except for the study by Summers, Slovic, Hine, and Zuliani (in press) and a
demonstration by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showing that the nonlinear value function does
seem to apply to gains and losses oflife, little empirical work has been conducted that
investigates psychophysical numbing in the domain oflife saving. The three studies reported
here explored how people value life-saving interventions. We hypothesized that respondents'
judgments would exhibit psychophysical numbing by responding to life-saving interventions in a
manner consistent with prospect theory's value function. Studies 1and 2 examined how the
perceived benefit of saving lives changed when interventions saving the same number of people
are implemented in tragedies that differ in magnitude. We predicted that such life-saving
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interventions would be valued more highly when the number of lives at risk was small than when
the number at risk was large. We alsopredicted that saving lives later in an intervention, bringing
the death toll closer to zero, would be valued more highly. Study 3 examined how the total
number ofpeople at risk influenced people's estimates of the number of lives an intervention
must save tojustify a fixed amount of funding. We predicted that, when thenumber at riskwas
larger, the intervention would be required to save more lives.
1. Study 1
1.1. Method
Materials and Procedure. Undergraduate volunteers (n = 54) from two sections of an
economics statistics course were instructed in a short questionnaire to imagine themselves as a
government official ofa small, developing country and were asked to evaluate four government
programs (Programs A, B, C, and D) being considered for funding. Each ofthe programs "cost
about the same" and addressed the following issues: the employment problem in their country,
the transportation problem in their country, and the life-threatening refugee problem in Rwanda.3
The transportation program proposed to remedy poor road conditions, and the employment
program proposed to decrease the jobless rate. There were two Rwandan refugee programs, each
proposing to provide enough clean water to save the lives of4,500 refugees suffering from
cholera inneighboring Zaire. The Rwandan programs differed only inthe size ofthe refugee
camps where the water would be distributed; one program proposed to offer water to a camp of
250,000 refugees and the other proposed to offer it to a camp of 11,000.
Respondents evaluated the programs in pairs, one pair per page. Because the two
Rwandan programs were never paired together, only five ofthe six possible pairings appeared in
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the booklets. All respondents evaluated the same paired comparisons, presented in one of two
randomized orders. Eachpagecontained briefdescriptions of two programs being compared,
followed bya response scale such as that shown below for Programs A and B.
Program A __^ Program B
65432 1012 3456
Strong Slight No Slight Strong
preference preference pref. preference preference
for A for A forB forB
On the last page, participants responded to several questions designed to verify whether
they perceived that the same number ofrefugees would be saved by either ofthe Rwandan
programs. The final item requested respondents to briefly explain whether it was better to save
lives in the smaller or the larger refugee camp, and why.
1.2. Results and Discussion
The manipulation checks verified that most respondents correctly perceived that the two
Rwandan programs savedthe samenumber of lives.
Ratings on the 13-point preference scale constituted the dependent measure. For the four
pairings containing a Rwandan program, participants' responses were subsequently recoded so
that a preference for the Rwanda program ina pair was indicated by a positive number and a
preference for the non-Rwandan program in apair was coded as anegative number. For example,
in apair containing the large-camp program and the transportation program, ifa participant
circled a "2" to indicate a slight preference for thetransportation program, therating would have
been re-coded as a "-2." Thus, participants' re-coded responses ranged from -6 to +6. Because
responses in the transportation vs. employment program comparison were not oftheoretical
interest, they were excluded from the analysis. An analysis ofvariance on respondents'
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preferences revealedno effectsdue to respondents' genderor to the order in which the paired
comparisons were presented. Data were therefore combined without regard for these variables.
We predicted that preference ratingswould be greaterfor the small-camp programthan
the large-camp program. Because theseprograms were neverpairedtogether, however, we
compared respondents' ratings for the two Rwandan programs in pairings that shared a common
non-Rwandan program. For example, we compared respondents' ratings in the transportation ys,.
the small-camp pairing with theirratings in the transportation vs^. the large-camp pairing. We
expected that there-coded rating for the small-camp pairing would begreater than therating for
the large-camp pairing.
Thisprediction wastested using a within-subjects, 2x2 analysis of variance on
preference ratings, varying comparison program type (transportation oremployment) and
Rwanda camp size (large or small). As predicted, theresults revealed a camp-size main effect,
F(l, 52) = 8.24, p. < .01 (see Figure 1). Even though most respondents realized that the same
number of refugees couldbe savedin eithercamp, they preferred the small-camp program
(M = .45) over the large-camp program (M =-.20)when paired with either the transportation or
employment programs.
The same ANOVA was conducted on the preferences of 22 respondents who indicated on
the lastpage of the booklet that saving 4,500 lives in the large camp was neither better norworse
than saving 4,500 lives in the small camp. Even these respondents, who indicated no preference
between one life-saving Rwandan program and theother when asked directly, preferred the
small-camp program (M = -93) over the large-camp program (M = .41) when evaluations were
maskedby pairedcomparisons, F(l, 21)=3.92; rj = .06.
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One last question askedrespondents whether it was betterto save lives in the smalleror
the larger refugee camp, andto state why. About 44% of respondents reported that it was better
to save lives in the smallercamp. As perhaps the strongest evidence for the psychophysical
numbing hypothesis thus far, this result is quite remarkable, especially considering that the life-
saving potential ofeach Rwandan program was reinforced by the preceding question in which
nearly all respondents reported that the interventions would save the same number of lives.
Approximately 42% ofrespondents reported no preference between the two programs and 14%)
indicated that it was better to save lives in the larger camp.
We suggest that the sizable proportion ofrespondents who preferred to save lives in the
smaller camp reflects people's general tendency tobecome desensitized to the life-saving
potential of interventions applied to larger tragedies. However, what appears tobe
psychophysical numbing might not be caused by insensitivity at all, but actually by respondents'
sensitivity to preventing further casualties among refugees—an eminently reasonable goal.
Respondents might have preferred the small-camp program because ofthe increased hazard of
administering a limited supply ofa scarce commodity to a large and desperately needy group of
people, as might likely be found in a large camp. Not only might such an effort incur additional
casualties through the riot it could spark, but people could be at greater risk of infection or later
re-infection due to the increased tendency for water-borne diseasesto spread in a larger
compared to a smaller refugee camp. We have labeled these explanations the riot and contagion
hypotheses, respectively.
Evidence in the present study suggested that most respondents considered neither the riot
nor the contagion hypotheses. In fact, only one participant mentioned the riot hypothesis as a
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rationale when responding to the final question (i.e., whether it was better to save lives in the
small or the large refugee camp, and why). Seven respondents, however, did cite some form of
the contagion hypothesis, though several used it to support their preference for saving lives in the
larger camp. The fact that even the 22 respondents who stated that saving lives in the larger camp
was neither better nor worse than saving lives in the small camp exhibited psychophysical
numbing also speaks against these hypotheses. Unless a substantial portion of respondents used
but failed to report one or both of these hypotheses as part of their rationale, we believe it
unlikely that either hypothesis could be widely responsible for the effects found in the above
analyses.
Furthermore, the next study reports data that not only replicates the present study, but
provides evidence that essentially rules out both the riot and the contagion hypotheses as
alternative explanations for psychophysical numbing.
2. Study 2
Study2 retained much of the content and structure of the previous study. Participants first
read a coverstory about the Rwandan refugee crisisand then evaluated one small country's life-
saving intervention proposed for several refugee camps. Foreachcamp, all respondents
answeredtwo questions: (1) how beneficial would sending the aid be? and (2) should aid be sent
or not? Study 2, however, differedfromthe previous study in severalrespects. In Study 2,
comparisons between the Rwandan scenarios wereeasier, whichwouldpresumably lessen
psychophysical numbing among respondents. Whereas Study 1paired each Rwandan scenario
with a "dummy" scenario, making directcomparisons between Rwandan scenarios more
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difficult, Study 2 omitted dummy scenarios and had respondents evaluate Rwandan scenarios
individually.
Though easier in this regard, Study 2 was generally more complex because it contained a
more detailed cover story and incorporated two additional independent variables. Besides the
camp-sizemanipulation found in the previous study, Study2 manipulated when in the life-saving
process the humanitarian aid was distributed. We predicted that saving a portionof lives near the
end of a crisis would be valued more highly than saving an equal portion near the beginning of a
crisis because the former solves virtually all the problem whereas the latter does not. Study 2 also
manipulated the "reliability" of the equipment usedto administer the aid (i.e., purifiedwater).
We included this variable to discourage respondents from rating the intervention as maximally
beneficial in every scenario.
2.1. Method
Overviewof Design. The presentstudy manipulated three within-subjects variables: size
of refugee camp (11,000 or 250,000), amount of pure-water aid a camp wasreceiving before a
water-purification plane was sent(low orhigh), andreliability of the plane (60% or 100%). This
yielded the eight different scenarios participants read and it allowed us to analyze their responses
in a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures factorial design.
All respondents evaluated the sameeight scenarios. Half received the blockof four
100%-reliable planescenarios first andthe block of four 60%-reliable plane scenarios second,
and half received the blocks of four in the reverse order. Within each block of four scenarios, the
"camp-size" and "prior-help" variables were mixed according to a latin-square design.
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There were two dependent variables: (1) the rated benefit of sending a plane, and (2) a
yes/no decision on whether or not to send a plane.
Materials and Procedure. University of Oregon students (n = 162) were paid $4 to
completean 11-page questionnaire about the Rwandan refugee crisis. The cover story of the
questionnaire informedrespondents that the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees was
coordinating a massivehumanitarian aid campaign by requesting that able countries send
assistance to the Rwandan refugees in Zaire. Many refugees had a water-borne disease and would
die if purified water did not soon become available. One small country was considering sending
one of two Dash-8 water-purification planes to Zaire. Although eachwater system was capable
of producing only a small fraction of thewater needed, each could keep about 1500 disease
victims alive each day. The purification system in one planewas 100% reliable, and the system
in the otherplanewasonly60%) reliable—reliable in the sense that there wasonlya "60%>
chance that the system wouldwork once it got to Zaire." Once a plane was operating in a camp,
respondents were informed that, "aid-workers will distribute theclean water to designated
disease victims, which usually saves the victims' lives." The cost to this small country of
delivering andoperating these purification systems was significant in light of its economy.
The following pages contained eightscenarios about the four refugee camps (seeTable 1
for a summary of information given in the eightscenarios). Eachscenario was identically
structured. Forexample, on onepagerespondents read the following scenario (Scenario 1):
"Thecityof Moga in Zaire now has about 11,000 Rwandan refugees. Fewwater
purification systems from other countries are now inplace. 5% ofthe clean water needed
for diseasevictimsin this camp is currently beingmet. If the 100%-reliable Dash-8 water
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purification plane is sent to Moga, 50% of this camp's water need for disease victims
would be met."
For scenarios using the 60%-reliable plane, the following phrase was added: "...,
provided the purification system works."
In the other small-camp scenarios (Fizi 1 and Fizi 2—see Table 1), 50%) of the clean
water need was currently being met, so the aid increased this to 95%, provided the system
worked.
In the two scenarios involving the large (250,000 refugees) camp, Uvira, the prior aid met
5% of the water need and the additional aid would bring this to 7%. In the scenarios involving
the Kalehe camp (scenarios 7 and 8), 93% of the waterneed was being met and the additional aid
wouldbring this to 95%. Thus, the intervention proposed to save2% of disease victims in a
given large camp and45%) of disease victims in a given small camp. Recall, however, that the
same absolute number of lives (1500) would be saved in each case, regardless of camp size.
Each scenario was followed by two questions. First, "What would be the benefit of
sending this Dash-8 plane to this camp?" Respondents answered this question on a nine-point
Likert scale, titled "Benefit," anchored at the ends by: 0 ("extremely low benefit") and 8
("extremely high benefit"). Second, they were asked, "Given the benefit indicated on the scale
above, would it be worth sending the plane to this camp?" Respondents circled either "Yes" or
"No." On each page, participants were reminded that responses to each scenario should be
independent of their responses to the otherscenarios.
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After completing this task, participants responded to a questiondesignedto assess
whether they correctly perceivedthat the same numberof lives would be savedby an
intervention, regardless of the size of campwhere it was implemented.
2.2. Results and Discussion
A checkon subjects' understanding of the problem revealed that 60% of respondents
correctly perceived that the water systems would save about the same number of lives regardless
of refugee camp size, 23% believed that substantially more lives would be saved in the larger
camp, and 17% believed that substantially more lives would be saved inthe smaller camp. The
analyses reported below omitted this last group ofrespondents because their belief could have
quite reasonably lead them to prefer implementing the intervention in the small camps, not
because ofpsychophysical numbing but simply because it could have saved more lives.
A 2 x 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVA onrespondents' benefit ratings provided strong
support for the psychophysical numbing hypothesis (see Figure 2). Asignificant main effect for
camp size, F (1, 132) = 160.5, p < .001, indicated that respondents believed sending the planes to
small camps was more beneficial (M_ = 6.46) than sending them to large camps (M = 4.54). A
main effect for the prior-aid variable, F (1,132) = 15.35, p < .001, indicated that respondents
believed sending the planes to camps that were already satisfying a substantial portion oftheir
clean-water need was more beneficial (M = 5.73) than sending them to camps that were only
satisfying a small portion oftheir water need (M = 5.27). And, not surprisingly, the results
revealed a main effect for plane reliability, F (1, 132) = 12.01, p < .001, indicating that
respondents believed the 100%-reliable plane (M_ = 5.67) was more beneficial than the 60%-
reliable plane (M= 5.33). No other effects were significant.
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As predicted, respondents appeared to favor interventions morewhen implemented in the
later stagesof the life-saving process. For example, respondents thought it was morebeneficial to
save 2% of those at risk when the threat of a tragedy was nearly contained than when it was just
beginning to take its toll. Astheabsence of interaction effects indicated, this was as true for
small camps as it was for large.
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVAon respondents' dichotomous decisions about whetheror not to
send the planes to the camps also revealed a significant main effect forcamp size, F (1,
130) = 105.4, p < .001, indicating that respondents decided to send the planes to small camps
more often (93%) than to large camps (59%). Amain effect for plane reliability, F (1, 130) =
4.61, p < .05, indicated that respondents decided to send the reliable plane to the camps slightly
more often (78%>) than the unreliable plane (74%). Interestingly, the main effect for prior aid was
not significant, F (1, 130) = .47, p = .50. Respondents decided to send the planes 75% ofthe time
to camps receiving little prior aid, and 77% ofthe time to camps receiving substantial prior aid.
No other effects were significant.
The above analyses show that respondents' judgments and decisions about sending aid to
refugee camps differed greatly depending on camp size. It is possible that such responses could
be justified if they were based on some rationale such as the riot hypothesis orthe contagion
hypothesis. However, in addition to the evidence against the riot and contagion hypotheses from
Study 1, data from the present study provided strong evidence that neither ofthese alternative
hypotheses were widely considered. Ifrespondents had considered such explanations, one would
have expected them to substantially devalue the interventions for those scenarios in which the
risk ofrioting or re-infection was the greatest, namely, large camps in the early stages ofthe life-
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saving process. In these scenarios, respondents were faced with implementing an intervention
whose supply of aid was particularly inadequate for the demand (see Table 1, Uvira 1 and Uvira
2). The data, however, didnotreflect this interaction pattern. Rather, respondents devalued
interventions to the same degree both in large campsneeding little additional aid and large camps
needing massive additional aid.
3. Study 3
In the previous studies, we asked respondents to make evaluations about one type of
intervention (saving a fixed number of lives) applied to several tragic circumstances varying in
magnitude. In Study 3 we asked respondents toestimate the minimum number of lives each of
several interventions must save to merit a fixed amount of money. If people tend to view an
amount of assistance in a large tragedy as less valuable than an equivalent amount in a small
tragedy, as was shown inthe previous studies, then they should require more life-saving
assistance to be "added" to the large tragedy to make theassistance in each of equal value. In the
present study, therefore, we predicted that respondents' estimates ofthe minimum number of
lives each intervention would have to save would be greater for the larger than the smaller
tragedies.
3.1. Method
Materials and Procedure. University of Oregon students (n = 165)werepaid $4 to
complete a questionnaire asking them to imagine that they were the chairperson on the board of
"Science ForLife," a charitable foundation in charge of distributing large sums ofmoney to
research institutions that develop treatments for serious diseases. Each respondent was asked to
determine which medical institutions ScienceFor Life should fund with its limited resources.
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The three medical institutions (X, Y, and Z) that were requesting support each proposed to
implement a new treatment that would significantlyreduce the annual number of deaths caused
by a particular disease.
Respondents were also instructed to assume that: (1) the treatments will induce a cure for
some people and thus "savetheir lives," and(2) the people who arenot cured will experience no
other beneficial effect; that is, the treatment will not improve their "quality of life."
Respondents completed two tasks: an estimation taskanda ranking task. The first task
required them to estimate for each disease "How large a reduction in yearly deaths makes [the]
institution worthy of funding?"
Eachrespondent made estimates for all three medical institutions. Eachpageof the
questionnaire presented information about one medical institution, X, Y, or Z, and information
about the number of deaths caused in the previous year by the disease for which the institution
proposed treatment, Disease A, B,orC, respectively (see "Task 1Information" inTable 2).
Thus, on each page respondents read the following:
"Medical Institution (X) [Y] {Z} has developed a treatment for Disease (A) [B] {C} and
now requests $10 million from Science For Life. Last year, people with Disease (A) [B] {C} did
not have access to this treatment, and (15,000) [160,000] {290,000} died from the disease. Given
Science For Life's shrinking budget, what is the minimum number of livesthis treatment would
have to save nextyear in orderfor Medical Institution (X) [Y] {Z} to merit funding?"
Respondents recorded their estimates ona blank line provided oneach page. Six versions
of the questionnaire were distributed, reflecting all possible orderings ofthe three stimulus
scenarios.
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The second task asked the same respondents to imagine that they must now choose which
proposal among the three submitted should receive the $10 million. They were told that partial
funding was not possible and they must rank order the three medical institutions. Before giving
their preference order, respondents were told that: (a) Institution X would reduce deaths from
Disease A from approximately 15,000 per year to about 5,000 per year, (b) Institution Y would
reduce deaths from Disease B from approximately 160,000 per year to about 145,000 per year,
and (c) InstitutionZ would reducedeaths from Disease C from approximately 290,000per year
to about 270,000 per year (see "Task 2 Information" in Table 2).
Thus, there was an inverse relationship between "number of lives saved" and "proportion
of lives saved": Disease C deaths were to be reduced by the greatest number (20,000) but by the
smallest percentage (7%>), whereas Disease A deaths were to be reduced by the smallest number
(10,000) but by the greatest percentage (67%). Respondents were asked to rankthe three
proposals from most worthy to least worthy to receive the $10 million funding.
Results and Discussion
The results from Task 1 indicated that a majority of respondents exhibited
psychophysical numbing (see Table 3). When estimating the minimum number of lives an
institution's treatment must save to merit a $10 million award, 65% of participants gave
estimates that increased as the size of the population at risk increased. Approximately 28%)
required that the same number be saved, regardless of size, and 7%> gave either varied or
decreasing estimates. We also calculated the medians and geometric means, which are less
affected byextreme values. Table 3 shows that thearithmetic means, medians, and geometric
means all reflect a substantial effect consistent with psychophysical numbing.
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For those who responded in accord with the numbing hypothesis, the median number of
lives Institution Y's treatment was required to save (mdn. = 60,000) was more than six times
greater than that of X's treatment (mdn.=9,000), whereas the medianestimate for Z's treatment
(mdn. = 100,000) was more than 11 times greater than the estimate for X's treatment.
Interestingly, for the 28% of respondents whoseestimates did not vary with diseasesize, the
median estimate was only 100, far less than that of the psychophysicalnumbing respondents'
estimates for even the small-scale disease (mdn. = 9,000).
Figure 3 shows the proportionof lives that respondents required each disease treatment to
save. Three clearly defined groupsemerged from the analysis: 16 respondents (10%)made
estimates such that the proportionof lives savedremained constant across diseasesize; 91
respondents (55%) made estimates such that, as disease size increased, theproportion saved
decreased, but at a rate where the numberrequired to be savedwas greater for larger diseases;
and 47 respondents (28%) made estimates such that, as thedisease size increased, the proportion
saved decreased at a rate such that the number of lives saved remained constant. The remaining
11 individuals (7%) exhibited no consistent pattern, and were therefore not included in anyof the
three groups mentioned.
Theseresults suggest that respondents evaluated the interventions using two evaluation
strategies. Some respondents appeared to employ a proportion rule; some, an absolute number
rule; and still others seemed to employ some combinationof the two. That is, some respondents
believed a given institution to be "worthy" offunding only if the ratio ofnumber of lives saved
to total number of lives at risk reached some proportion threshold (proportion rule). Those who
followed the number rule also held a threshold, but one that was based on an absolute number of
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lives saved rather than a proportion saved. The majority of respondents, however, fell into a third
group that made estimates in a manner consistent with an anchoring and adjustment process. In
such a process, for example, one might choose a reasonable proportion threshold for the smallest
disease treatment, say "must save at least 50% of those at risk", and then adjust this threshold
downward for the treatments of larger diseases, say "save 47%" for the medium disease and
"save 45%>" for the largest disease. In fact, many of the 55% of respondents who appeared in this
category imposed proportion thresholds that were within 5% across the three disease treatments.
In Task 2, we gave information about the annual expected reduction in deaths for each of
the three disease treatments (see "Task 2 information" in Table 2). Respondents then rank
ordered the treatments from "Most worthy" to "Least worthy" to receive funding. The results
were quite different from those of Task 1 (see Table 4). More than 60% of respondents preferred
to fund disease treatments that maximized the number of lives saved, preferring Institution Z
(20,000 saved) over Institution Y (15,000 saved) over Institution X (10,000 saved).
Approximately 16% preferred treatments that maximized the proportion of lives saved, choosing
the preference order XYZ. The remaining 34% of respondents fell somewhere in between the
above two groups, choosingpreference ordersthat maximized neither the numberof lives saved
nor the proportion of lives saved.
The three groups that emerged in Task 2 roughly corresponded to those that emerged in
Task 1, though the proportion of respondents in each did not. In Task 2, a majority of
respondents seemedto employ the absolute numberrule by consistently preferring to save a
greater number of lives; others seemed to employ a proportion rule by consistently preferring to
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save a greater proportion of lives, and about one third seemed to attempt some combination of
the two strategies.
The results of Task 2 underscore two important points. First, the task format can
significantly influence the degree of psychophysical numbing. Second, even in the rather simple
and transparent format studied here, psychophysical numbing does not disappear.
4. General Discussion
Evidence from the present studies shows that people often judge the value of life-saving
efforts in much the same way they judge the intensity of stimuli in traditional psychophysical
experiments. Just as a fixed decrease in brightness seems greater when the original intensity is
small than when it is large, an intervention saving a fixed number of lives seems more valuable
when fewer lives are at risk to begin with—when the savings is a larger proportion of the number
at risk. When such psychophysical numbing occurs, the value of a life-saving intervention is
inversely proportional to the magnitude of the threat rather than being determined by the absolute
number of lives the intervention can save.
A significant portion of the respondents in each of the present studies exhibited
psychophysical numbing. Manyrespondents in the first two studies judged interventions serving
larger refugee camps to be considerably less valuable than ones serving smaller camps, even
though the interventions could save the same numberof lives. Furthermore, when respondents in
Task 1 of Study 3 estimated the number of lives several proposed disease treatments would have
to save to be equally worthy of a fixed amount of funding, median estimates were more than 11
times greater for the intervention that treated the disease killing 290,000annually than the one
killing 15,000 annually.
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Although psychophysical numbing was present in each study, its prevalence varied. This
is important because it shows that the incidence of the phenomenon is mutable. For example,
over 67% of participants responded psychophysical^ in Task 1 of Study 3, whereas only 16%>
responded psychophysical^ in Task 2. In addition, Study 3 suggested that those most likely to
see the value of an intervention as independent of a problem's size were also the ones who
attached the greatest value to saving lives generally. For example, psychophysical respondents in
Study 3 required over 1,000 times as many lives to be saved (median estimate) in the largest
disease category than respondents who gave consistent responses (see Table 3)!
There are several other features in the present studies that may have affected the degree
to which psychophysical numbing occurred. First, the way information about life-saving
interventions was framed changed the degree of numbing. In Study 3, for example, numbing was
frequent when information about the interventions highlighted the magnitude of each tragedy
(Task 1), but far less frequent when the information emphasizedthe magnitude of each
intervention's life-saving potential (Task 2). Thus, descriptions of events that focus on the
outcomes of the intervention rather than the tragedy it serves appear to reduce the degree of
psychophysical numbing.
Second, the ease of comparison between different interventions may have also
contributed to the degree of numbing respondents exhibited. In Task 2 of Study 3, where the
numbing incidence was low, information on each interventionand tragedy was presented side-
by-side, whereas in Task 1, information about each tragedy was presented on separate pages.
Study 1 also showed that ease of comparison may have beena factor. Those who, when asked
directly, reported no preference between two interventions that savedthe samenumber of lives,
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nevertheless preferred the intervention serving the smaller tragedy in the previous task where
direct comparisons were more difficult.
Despite this variability, however, the present studies suggest that psychophysical
numbing is a robust phenomenon—ingrained in the workings of our cognitive and perceptual
systems, which seem geared to sensitize us to small changes in our environment, perhaps at the
cost of making us less able to appreciate and respond adequately to large changes. When we
contemplate nuclear war, for example, and its immense capability for death and destruction, it
may be difficult to escape psychophysical numbing as we attempt to grasp the significance of the
difference between 10,000, 100,000, or a million or more deaths. Where we lack perceptual
sensitivity, we might also expect to find that our language is also inadequate to discriminate
among degrees ofharm or destructiveness. Thus John Hersey's elegant chronicle of the aftermath
of the Hiroshima bombing (which killed about 140,000 people) simply refers to the scene as
havoc (Hersey, 1946, p. 5) and terrible (p. 86). Lifton (1967) refers to Hiroshima as a disaster, a
term commonly applied to events that are far less severe. Holocaust, catastrophe, calamity,
tragedy ... the vocabulary of disaster seems sparse indeed. Can the potential deaths of large
numbers of peoplereally be comprehended without an adequate vocabulary of destructiveness?
Some who have worried about the incomprehension of mass destruction are pessimistic.
Humphrey (1981), for example,writesof our ability to be moved greatlyby the plight of single
human beings at the expense of insensitivity to "giant dangers." He says:
"In a week when 3,000 people are killed by an earthquake in Iran, a lone boy falls down a
well shaft in Italy—and the whole world grieves. Six million Jews are put to death in
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Hitler's Germany, and it is Anne Frank trembling in her garret that remains stamped in
our memory."
We must live with this ... It will not change. I do not expect my dog to learn to
read The Times, and I do not expect myself or any other human being to learn the
meaning ofnuclear war or to speak rationally about megadeaths ..." (pp. 21-22).
Yet writers such as Hersey, Lifton, Jonathan Schell (1982), and many others do have the
powerto move us emotionally withtheireloquent descriptions of individual and societal
tragedies despite the lackof adequate one-word descriptors. Is that a signthat we can, indeed,
comprehend these tragedies in a way that will help us to make good decisions about preventing
them or managing their risks?
Modern technology has greatpowerto cause, prevent, and alleviate mass human
suffering. Yet thepsychophysical numbing we have observed in our studies is strong enough and
pervasive enough to raise some disturbing questions about ourability to make rational decisions
when many lives areat stake. Further research is clearly needed to illuminate the dynamics of
psychophysical numbing anddetermine its effects on decision making.
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* We acknowledge with thanks support from the National Science Foundation under
Grant Number SBR-9422754 to Decision Research and a Graduate Research Fellowship granted
to the first author. Anyopinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this
paper are those of theauthors and donot necessarily reflect theviews of theNational Science
Foundation. We also thank Sarah Lichtenstein for her comments on the manuscript and Leisha
Mullican for her technical assistance in the preparation of the report.
1. A striking example of psychophysical insensitivity to money was Ronald Reagan's
assertion that a $4.6 billion job program "would addvirtually nothing to the federal budget"
{Eugene Register-Guard, March 25, 1983).
2. Lifton (1967) used theterm "psychic numbing" to refer to theaccommodation and
reduced sensitivity to shocking and emotionally overwhelming threats and experiences, such as
those created by nuclear war. Hiroshima survivors, forexample, saidthat they very quickly
"ceased to feel." Weuse the term"psychophysical numbing" to reflect a more cognitive or
perceptual form ofinsensitivity as opposed to the affective quality ofpsychic numbing. Whereas
psychic numbing is adaptive, enabling survivors and rescue workers to cope with trauma,
psychophysical numbing may degrade our ability to appreciate the consequences ofour actions.
3. In the summerof 1994, when these data were collected, ethnic warfare in Rwandahad
resulted in over a million refugees fleeing into neighboring Zaire. The brutal nature of thecivil
war, as well as the problems ofdisease and hunger that plagued the refugees, had made the .
Rwandan conflict thetopic of considerable print, radio, and television news attention (Cooper,
1994; Purvis, 1994; WoridNews Tonight, 1994a, 1994b). Participants' likely familiarity with the
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Rwanda crisis should have helped to make the potential loss of life addressed in the judgment
task particularly salient and realistic.
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Table 1
Summary of Information in the Eight Scenarios Given to All Respondents in Study 2
Scenario
number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Zairian
refugee
camp
Moga 1
Moga2
Fizi 1
Fizi 2
Uvira 1
Uvira 2
Kalehe 1
Kalehe 2
Camp size
11,000
11,000
11,000
11,000
250,000
250,000
250,000
250,000
Water
system
reliability
100%
60%
100%
60%
100%
60%
100%
60%
Prior aid
5%
5%
50%
50%
5%
5%
93%
93%
Post aid
50%
50%
95%
95%
7%
7%
95%
95%
Note. The prior-aid variable indicates the amount of pure water need being met for disease
victims in a camp before the aid was delivered. Post aid indicates the water need that would be
met for disease victims after the aid was provided. Within each level of plane reliability, the
intervention in each camp was capable ofkeeping the same number of disease victims (1500)
alive each day (which usually saves the victims' lives).
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Table 2
Information Given to Respondents in Task 1 and Task 2 of Study 3
Number of deaths per year
Task 1 Task 2
Medical institution Disease treated Last year This year Next year
X A 15,000 15,000 5,000
Y B 160,000 160,000 145,000
Z C 290,000 290,000 270,000
Note. In Task 1, respondents were asked to indicate the minimum number of lives the treatment
would have to save to merit $10 million in funding. In Task 2, respondents were asked to rank
order the three programs with regard to priority for receiving $10 million in support.
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Table 3
Estimated Minimum Number of Lives Each Institution Would Be Required
to Save in Task 1 of Study 3
Arithmetic mean
Geometric mean
Median
Lower quartile
Upper quartile
Psychophysical numbing
respondents Consistent respondents
n = 107 (65%) n = 47 (28%)
Institution
X
7746 63780 111625
4701 32678 56707
9000 60000 100000
3000 16000 29000
10000 100000 200000
Institution
X
3047 3047 3047
100 100 100
100 100 100
1.1 1
5000 5000 5000
Note: Institutions X, Y, and Z each proposed treatment for a disease that caused 15,000, 160,000,
and 290,000 annual deaths, respectively.
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Table 4
Task 2 in Study 3: Frequency and Percentage of Respondents' Preference Orders (N = 164)
Maximize number of Maximize proportion
lives saved of lives saved Other
Preference
order-f ZYX XYZ XZY YXZ YZX ZXY
Frequency 99 26 15 9 7 8
Percentage 60% 16% 9% 5% 4% 5%
Note: Institution X proposed a treatment that would reduce annual deaths by 10,000 (67% of
those at risk); Institution Y proposed a treatment that would reduce annual deaths by 15,000
(9%); Institution Z proposed a treatment that would reduce annual deaths by 20,000 (7%).
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Main effects in Study 1 for Rwanda camp size (11,000 or 250,000) and program
type (transportation or employment) using preference ratings from paired comparisons. Ratings
were coded on a 13-point scale (-6 to +6). Positive numbers indicate preference for a Rwanda
program over a non-Rwanda program.
Figure 2. Main effects in Study 2 for the three within-subjects variables: camp size
(11,000 or 250,000), prior aid (low or high), and water-system reliability (60%) or 100%). Benefit
ratingwas scored on a scalefrom 0 (low) to 8 (high).
Figure 3. Respondents' estimates in terms of proportion of lives that each institution
should save (Study 3).
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Figure 1. Main effects for Rwanda camp size (11,000 or 250,000)
and program type (transportation or employment) using preference
ratings from paired comparisons. Ratings were made on a 13-point
scale (-6 to +6). Positive numbers indicate preference for a
Rwanda program over a non-Rwanda program.
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Figure 2. Main effects in Study 2 for the three within-subjects variables:
camp size (11,000 or 250,000), prior aid (low or high), and water-system
reliability (60% or 100%). Benefit rating was scored on a scale from 0 (low)
to 8 (high).
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